Man, being the servant and interpreter of Nature, can do and
understand so much and so much only as he has observed in fact or in
thought of the course of nature. Beyond this he neither knows anything
nor can do anything.
Bacon, Francis.
The New Organion [Book One]. 1620.
Neither the naked hand nor the understanding left to itself can
effect much. It is by instruments and helps that the work is done, which
are as much wanted for the understanding as for the hand. And as the
instruments of the hand either give motion or guide it, so the
instruments of the mind supply either suggestions for the understanding
or cautions.
Bacon, Francis.
The New Organion [Book One]. 1620.
Human knowledge and human power meet in one; for where the cause is
not known the effect cannot be produced. Nature to be commanded must be
obeyed; and that which in contemplation is as the cause is in operation
as the rule.
Bacon, Francis.
The New Organion [Book One]. 1620.
Toward the effecting of works, all that man can do is to put together
or put asunder natural bodies. The rest is done by nature working
within.
Bacon, Francis.
The New Organion [Book One]. 1620.
Far more, however, has knowledge suffered from littleness of spirit
and the smallness and slightness of the tasks which human industry has
proposed to itself. And what is worst of all, this very littleness of
spirit comes with a certain air of arrogance and superiority.
Bacon, Francis.
The New Organion [Book One]. 1620.
Those who have handled sciences have been either men of experiment or
men of dogmas. The men of experiment are like the ant, they only
collect and use; the reasoners resemble spiders, who make cobwebs out of
their own substance. But the bee takes a middle course: it gathers its
material from the flowers of the garden and of the field, but transforms
and digests it by a power of its own. Not unlike this is the true
business of philosophy; for it neither relies solely or chiefly on the
powers of the mind, nor does it take the matter which it gathers from
natural history and mechanical experiments and lay it up in the memory
whole, as it finds it, but lays it up in the understanding altered and
digested. Therefore from a closer and purer league between these two
faculties, the experimental and the rational (such as has never yet been
made), much may be hoped.
Bacon, Francis.
The New Organion [Book One]. 1620.
Another argument of hope may be drawn from this — that some of the
inventions already known are such as before they were discovered it
could hardly have entered any man's head to think of; they would have
been simply set aside as impossible. For in conjecturing what may be men
set before them the example of what has been, and divine of the new
with an imagination preoccupied and colored by the old; which way of
forming opinions is very fallacious, for streams that are drawn from the
springheads of nature do not always run in the old channels.
Bacon, Francis.
The New Organion [Book One]. 1620.
It remains for me to say a few words touching the excellency of the
end in view. Had they been uttered earlier, they might have seemed like
idle wishes, but now that hopes have been raised and unfair prejudices
removed, they may perhaps have greater weight. Also if I had finished
all myself, and had no occasion to call in others to help and take part
in the work, I should even now have abstained from such language lest it
might be taken as a proclamation of my own deserts. But since I want to
quicken the industry and rouse and kindle the zeal of others, it is
fitting that I put men in mind of some things.
Bacon, Francis. Bacon, Francis.
The New Organion [Book Two]. 1620.
On a given body, to generate and superinduce a new nature or new
natures is the work and aim of human power. Of a given nature to
discover the form, or true specific difference, or nature-engendering
nature, or source of emanation (for these are the terms which come
nearest to a description of the thing), is the work and aim of human
knowledge. Subordinate to these primary works are two others that are
secondary and of inferior mark: to the former, the transformation of
concrete bodies, so far as this is possible; to the latter, the
discovery, in every case of generation and motion, of the latent process
carried on from the manifest efficient and the manifest material to the
form which is engendered; and in like manner the discovery of the
latent configuration of bodies at rest and not in motion.
Bacon, Francis. Bacon, Francis.
The New Organion [Book Two]. 1620.
But this latent process of which I speak is quite another thing than
men, preoccupied as their minds now are, will easily conceive. For what I
understand by it is not certain measures or signs or successive steps
of process in bodies, which can be seen; but a process perfectly
continuous, which for the most part escapes the sense.
Bacon, Francis. Bacon, Francis.
The New Organion [Book Two]. 1620.
In what situation and kind of soil warm baths usually spring has not
been sufficiently examined; and therefore no negative is subjoined.
Bacon, Francis. Bacon, Francis.
The New Organion [Book Two]. 1620.
Thirdly, we must make a presentation to the understanding of
instances in which the nature under inquiry is found in different
degrees, more or less; which must be done by making a comparison either
of its increase and decrease in the same subject, or of its amount in
different subjects, as compared one with another. For since the form of a
thing is the very thing itself, and the thing differs from the form no
otherwise than as the apparent differs from the real, or the external
from the internal, or the thing in reference to man from the thing in
reference to the universe, it necessarily follows that no nature can be
taken as the true form, unless it always decrease when the nature in
question decreases, and in like manner always increase when the nature
in question increases. This Table therefore I call the Table of Degrees or the Table of Comparison.
Bacon, Francis. Bacon, Francis.
The New Organion [Book Two]. 1620.
The work and office of these three tables I call the Presentation of
Instances to the Understanding. Which presentation having been made,
induction itself must be set at work; for the problem is, upon a review
of the instances, all and each, to find such a nature as is always
present or absent with the given nature, and always increases and
decreases with it; and which is, as I have said, a particular case of a
more general nature. Now if the mind attempt this affirmatively from the
first, as when left to itself it is always wont to do, the result will
be fancies and guesses and notions ill defined, and axioms that must be
mended every day, unless like the schoolmen we have a mind to fight for
what is false; though doubtless these will be better or worse according
to the faculties and strength of the understanding which is at work. To
God, truly, the Giver and Architect of Forms, and it may be to the
angels and higher intelligences, it belongs to have an affirmative
knowledge of forms immediately, and from the first contemplation. But
this assuredly is more than man can do, to whom it is granted only to
proceed at first by negatives, and at last to end in affirmatives after
exclusion has been exhausted.
Bacon, Francis. Bacon, Francis.
The New Organion [Book Two]. 1620.
We must make, therefore, a complete solution and separation of
nature, not indeed by fire, but by the mind, which is a kind of divine
fire. The first work, therefore, of true induction (as far as regards
the discovery of forms) is the rejection or exclusion of the several
natures which are not found in some instance where the given nature is
present, or are found in some instance where the given nature is absent,
or are found to increase in some instance when the given nature
decreases, or to decrease when the given nature increases. Then indeed
after the rejection and exclusion has been duly made, there will remain
at the bottom, all light opinions vanishing into smoke, a form
affirmative, solid, and true and well defined. This is quickly said; but
the way to come at it is winding and intricate. I will endeavor,
however, not to overlook any of the points which may help us toward it.
Bacon, Francis. Bacon, Francis.
The New Organion [Book Two]. 1620.
I must now give an example of the exclusion or rejection of natures
which by the Tables of Presentation are found not to belong to the form
of heat; observing in the meantime that not only each table suffices for
the rejection of any nature, but even any one of the particular
instances contained in any of the tables. For it is manifest from what
has been said that any one contradictory instance overthrows a
conjecture as to the form. But nevertheless for clearness' sake and that
the use of the tables may be more plainly shown, I sometimes double or
multiply an exclusion.
Bacon, Francis. Bacon, Francis.
The New Organion [Book Two]. 1620.
The Tables of First Presentation and the Rejection or process of
Exclusion being completed, and also the First Vintage being made
thereupon, we are to proceed to the other helps of the understanding in
the Interpretation of Nature and true and perfect Induction. In
propounding which, I mean, when Tables are necessary, to proceed upon
the Instances of Heat and Cold; but when a smaller number of examples
will suffice, I shall proceed at large; so that the inquiry may be kept
clear, and yet more room be left for the exposition of the system.
Bacon, Francis. Bacon, Francis.
The New Organion [Book Two]. 1620.
I propose to treat, then, in the first place, of Prerogative Instances; secondly, of the Supports of Induction; thirdly, of the Rectification of Induction; fourthly, of Varying the Investigation according to the nature of the Subject; fifthly, of Prerogative Natures with respect to Investigation, or of what should be inquired first and what last; sixthly, of the Limits of Investigation, or a synopsis of all natures in the universe; seventhly, of the Application to Practice, or of things in their relation to man; eighthly, of Preparations for Investigation; and lastly, of the Ascending and Descending Scale of Axioms.
Bacon, Francis. Bacon, Francis.
The New Organion [Book Two]. 1620.
Among Prerogative Instances I will put in the tenth place Instances
of Power , or of the Fasces (to borrow a term from the badges of
empire); which I also call Instances of the Wit, or Hands of Man.
These are the noblest and most consummate works in each art, exhibiting
the ultimate perfection of it. For since our main object is to make
nature serve the business and conveniences of man, it is altogether
agreeable to that object that the works which are already in man's power
should (like so many provinces formerly occupied and subdued) be noted
and enumerated, especially such as are the most complete and perfect;
because starting from them we shall find an easier and nearer passage to
new works hitherto unattempted. For if from an attentive contemplation
of these a man pushes on his work with zeal and activity, he will
infallibly either advance them a little further, or turn them aside to
something in their neighborhood, or even apply and transfer them to some
more noble use.
Bacon, Francis. Bacon, Francis.
The New Organion [Book Two]. 1620.
From what has been said it is clear that the five classes of
instances last mentioned (namely, Instances Conformable, Singular,
Deviating, Bordering, and of Power) ought not to be reserved until some
certain nature be in question (as the other instances which I have
placed first, and most of those that are to follow should), but a
collection of them must be begun at once, as a sort of particular
history; because they serve to digest the matters that enter the
understanding, and to correct the ill complexion of the understanding
itself, which cannot but be tinged and infected, and at length perverted
and distorted, by daily and habitual impression.
Bacon, Francis. Bacon, Francis.
The New Organion [Book Two]. 1620.
These instances therefore should be employed as a sort of preparative
for setting right and purging the understanding. For whatever withdraws
the understanding from the things to which it is accustomed, smooths
and levels its surface for the reception of the dry and pure light of
true ideas.
Bacon, Francis. Bacon, Francis.
The New Organion [Book Two]. 1620.
Moreover such instances pave and prepare the way for the operative
part, as will be shown in the proper place, when I come to speak of
deductions leading to Practice.
Bacon, Francis. Bacon, Francis.
The New Organion [Book Two]. 1620.
Among Prerogative Instances I will put in the seventeenth place
Summoning Instances , borrowing the name from the courts of law, because
they summon objects to appear which have not appeared before. I also
call them Evoking Instances . They are those which reduce the
nonsensible to the sensible, that is, make manifest things not directly
perceptible by means of others which are.
Bacon, Francis. Bacon, Francis.
The New Organion [Book Two]. 1620.
Observe also that at present I am dealing with the deficiencies of
the senses and their remedies. The deceptions of the senses must be
referred to the particular inquiries concerning sense and the objects of
sense, excepting only that grand deception of the senses, in that they
draw the lines of nature with reference to man and not with reference to
the universe; and this is not to be corrected except by reason and
universal philosophy.
Bacon, Francis. Bacon, Francis.
The New Organion [Book Two]. 1620.
Among Prerogative Instances I will put in the twenty-third place
Instances of Quantity , which (borrowing a term from medicine) I also
call Doses of Nature . These are they which measure virtues according to
the quantity of the bodies in which they subsist and show how far the
mode of the virtue depends upon the quantity of the body. And first
there are certain virtues which subsist only in a cosmical quantity,
that is, such a quantity as has consent with the configuration and
fabric of the universe. The earth for instance stands fast; its parts
fall. The waters in seas ebb and flow; but not in rivers, except through
the sea coming up. Secondly, almost all particular virtues act
according to the greater or less quantity of the body. Large quantities
of water corrupt slowly, small ones quickly. Wine and beer ripen and
become fit to drink much more quickly in bottles than in casks. If an
herb be steeped in a large quantity of liquid, infusion takes place
rather than impregnation; if in a small, impregnation rather than
infusion. Thus in its effect on the human body a bath is one thing, a
slight sprinkling another. Light dews, again, never fall in the air but
are dispersed and incorporated with it. And in breathing on precious
stones you may see the slight moisture instantly dissolved, like a cloud
scattered by the wind. Once more, a piece of a magnet does not draw so
much iron as the whole magnet. On the other hand there are virtues in
which smallness of quantity has more effect, as in piercing, a sharp
point pierces more quickly than a blunt one; a pointed diamond cuts
glass, and the like.
Bacon, Francis. Bacon, Francis.
The New Organion [Book Two]. 1620.
Among Prerogative Instances I will put in the twenty-fifth place
intimating instances , those, I mean, which intimate or point out what
is useful to man. For mere power and mere knowledge exalt human nature,
but do not bless it. We must therefore gather from the whole store of
things such as make most for the uses of life. But a more proper place
for speaking of these will be when I come to treat of applications to
practice. Besides, in the work itself of interpretation in each
particular subject, I always assign a place to the human chart , or
chart of things to be wished for . For to form judicious wishes is as
much a part of knowledge as to ask judicious questions.
Bacon, Francis. Bacon, Francis.
The New Organion [Book Two]. 1620.
Among Prerogative Instances I will put in the twenty-seventh and last
place Instances of Magic , by which I mean those wherein the material
or efficient cause is scanty or small as compared with the work and
effect produced. So that even where they are common they seem like
miracles; some at first sight, others even after attentive
consideration. These, indeed, nature of herself supplies sparingly, but
what she may do when her folds have been shaken out, and after the
discovery of forms and processes and configurations, time will show.
Bacon, Francis.
The New Organion [Book Two]. 1620.
In the entrance to the former of these — to clear the way and, as it
were, to make silence, to have the true testimonies concerning the
dignity of learning to be better heard, without the interruption of
tacit objections — I think good to deliver it from the discredits and
disgraces which it hath received, all from ignorance, but ignorance
severally disguised; appearing sometimes in the zeal and jealousy of
divines, sometimes in the severity and arrogancy of politics, and
sometimes in the errors and imperfections of learned men themselves.
Bacon, Francis.
The Advancement of Learning [Book I]. 1605.
I hear the former sort say that knowledge is of those things which
are to be accepted of with great limitation and caution; that the
aspiring to overmuch knowledge was the original temptation and sin
whereupon ensued the fall of man; that knowledge hath in it somewhat of
the serpent, and, therefore, where it entereth into a man it makes him
swell; Scientia inflat; that Solomon gives a censure, “That there is no
end of making books, and that much reading is weariness of the flesh;”
and again in another place, “That in spacious knowledge there is much
contristation, and that he that increaseth knowledge increaseth
anxiety;” that Saint Paul gives a caveat, “That we be not spoiled
through vain philosophy;” that experience demonstrates how learned men
have been arch-heretics, how learned times have been inclined to
atheism, and how the contemplation of second causes doth derogate from
our dependence upon God, who is the first cause.
Bacon, Francis.
The Advancement of Learning [Book I]. 1605.
To discover, then, the ignorance and error of this opinion, and the
misunderstanding in the grounds thereof, it may well appear these men do
not observe or consider that it was not the pure knowledge of Nature
and universality, a knowledge by the light whereof man did give names
unto other creatures in Paradise as they were brought before him
according unto their proprieties, which gave the occasion to the fall;
but it was the proud knowledge of good and evil, with an intent in man
to give law unto himself, and to depend no more upon God’s commandments,
which was the form of the temptation.
Bacon, Francis.
The Advancement of Learning [Book I]. 1605.
And as for the third point, it deserveth to be a little stood upon,
and not to be lightly passed over; for if any man shall think by view
and inquiry into these sensible and material things to attain that
light, whereby he may reveal unto himself the nature or will of God,
then, indeed, is he spoiled by vain philosophy; for the contemplation of
God’s creatures and works produceth (having regard to the works and
creatures themselves) knowledge, but having regard to God no perfect
knowledge, but wonder, which is broken knowledge. And, therefore, it was
most aptly said by one of Plato’s school, “That the sense of man
carrieth a resemblance with the sun, which (as we see) openeth and
revealeth all the terrestrial globe; but then, again, it obscureth and
concealeth the stars and celestial globe: so doth the sense discover
natural things, but it darkeneth and shutteth up divine.” And hence it
is true that it hath proceeded, that divers great learned men have been
heretical, whilst they have sought to fly up to the secrets of the Deity
by this waxen wings of the senses. And as for the conceit that too much
knowledge should incline a man to atheism, and that the ignorance of
second causes should make a more devout dependence upon God, which is
the first cause; first, it is good to ask the question which Job asked
of his friends: “Will you lie for God, as one man will lie for another,
to gratify him?”
Bacon, Francis.
The Advancement of Learning [Book I]. 1605.
And as for the disgraces which learning receiveth from politics, they
be of this nature: that learning doth soften men’s minds, and makes
them more unapt for the honour and exercise of arms; that it doth mar
and pervert men’s dispositions for matter of government and policy, in
making them too curious and irresolute by variety of reading, or too
peremptory or positive by strictness of rules and axioms, or too
immoderate and overweening by reason of the greatness of examples, or
too incompatible and differing from the times by reason of the
dissimilitude of examples; or at least, that it doth divert men’s
travails from action and business, and bringeth them to a love of
leisure and privateness; and that it doth bring into states a relaxation
of discipline, whilst every man is more ready to argue than to obey and
execute. Out of this conceit Cato, surnamed the Censor, one of the
wisest men indeed that ever lived, when Carneades the philosopher came
in embassage to Rome, and that the young men of Rome began to flock
about him, being allured with the sweetness and majesty of his eloquence
and learning, gave counsel in open senate that they should give him his
despatch with all speed, lest he should infect and enchant the minds
and affections of the youth, and at unawares bring in an alteration of
the manners and customs of the state.
Bacon, Francis.
The Advancement of Learning [Book II]. 1605.
But these and the like imputations have rather a countenance of
gravity than any ground of justice: for experience doth warrant that,
both in persons and in times, there hath been a meeting and concurrence
in learning and arms, flourishing and excelling in the same men and the
same ages. For as ‘for men, there cannot be a better nor the hike
instance as of that pair, Alexander the Great and Julius Caesar, the
Dictator; whereof the one was Aristotle’s scholar in philosophy, and the
other was Cicero’s rival in eloquence; or if any man had rather call
for scholars that were great generals, than generals that were great
scholars, let him take Epaminondas the Theban, or Xenophon the Athenian;
whereof the one was the first that abated the power of Sparta, and the
other was the first that made way to the overthrow of the monarchy of
Persia.
Bacon, Francis.
The Advancement of Learning [Book II]. 1605.
And for matter of policy and government, that learning, should rather
hurt, than enable thereunto, is a thing very improbable; we see it is
accounted an error to commit a natural body to empiric physicians, which
commonly have a few pleasing receipts whereupon they are confident and
adventurous, but know neither the causes of diseases, nor the
complexions of patients, nor peril of accidents, nor the true method of
cures; we see it is a like error to rely upon advocates or lawyers which
are only men of practice, and not grounded in their books, who are many
times easily surprised when matter falleth out besides their
experience, to the prejudice of the causes they handle: so by like
reason it cannot be but a matter of doubtful consequence if states be
managed by empiric statesmen, not well mingled with men grounded in
learning.
Bacon, Francis.
The Advancement of Learning [Book II]. 1605.
And as for those particular seducements or indispositions of the mind
for policy and government, which learning is pretended to insinuate; if
it be granted that any such thing be, it must be remembered withal that
learning ministereth in every of them greater strength of medicine or
remedy than it offereth cause of indisposition or infirmity. For if by a
secret operation it make men perplexed and irresolute, on the other
side by plain precept it teacheth them when and upon what ground to
resolve; yea, and how to carry things in suspense, without prejudice,
till they resolve.
Bacon, Francis.
The Advancement of Learning [Book II]. 1605.
And for the conceit that learning should dispose men to leisure and
privateness, and make men slothful: it were a strange thing if that
which accustometh the mind to a perpetual motion and agitation should
induce slothfulness, whereas, contrariwise, it may be truly affirmed
that no kind of men love business for itself but those that are learned;
for other persons love it for profit, as a hireling that loves the work
for the wages; or for honour, as because it beareth them up in the eyes
of men, and refresheth their reputation, which otherwise would wear; or
because it putteth them in mind of their fortune, and giveth them
occasion to pleasure and displeasure; or because it exerciseth some
faculty wherein they take pride, and so entertaineth them in good-humour
and pleasing conceits towards themselves; or because it advanceth any
other their ends.
Bacon, Francis.
The Advancement of Learning [Book II]. 1605.
And if any man be laborious in reading and study, and yet idle in
business and action, it groweth from some weakness of body or softness
of spirit, such as Seneca speaketh of: Quidam tam sunt umbratiles, ut
putent in turbido esse quicquid in luce est; and not of learning: well
may it be that such a point of a man’s nature may make him give himself
to learning, but it is not learning that breedeth any such point in his
nature.
Bacon, Francis.
The Advancement of Learning [Book II]. 1605.
And that learning should take up too much time or leisure: I answer,
the most active or busy man that hath been or can be, hath (no question)
many vacant times of leisure while he expecteth the tides and returns
of business (except he be either tedious and of no despatch, or lightly
and unworthily ambitious to meddle in things that may be better done by
others), and then the question is but how those spaces and times of
leisure shall be filled and spent; whether in pleasure or in studies; as
was well answered by Demosthenes to his adversary AEschines, that was a
man given to pleasure, and told him “That his orations did smell of the
lamp.” “Indeed,” said Demosthenes, “there is a great difference between
the things that you and I do by lamp-light.” So as no man need doubt
that learning will expel business, but rather it will keep and defend
the possession of the mind against idleness and pleasure, which
otherwise at unawares may enter to the prejudice of both.
Bacon, Francis.
The Advancement of Learning [Book II]. 1605.
Again, for that other conceit that learning should undermine the
reverence of laws and government, it is assuredly a mere depravation and
calumny, without all shadow of truth. For to say that a blind custom of
obedience should be a surer obligation than duty taught and understood,
it is to affirm that a blind man may tread surer by a guide than a
seeing man can by a light. And it is without all controversy that
learning doth make the minds of men gentle, generous, manageable, and
pliant to government; whereas ignorance makes them churlish, thwart, and
mutinous: and the evidence of time doth clear this assertion,
considering that the most barbarous, rude, and unlearned times have been
most subject to tumults, seditious, and changes.
Bacon, Francis.
The Advancement of Learning [Book II]. 1605.
Let this, therefore, serve for answer to politiques, which in their
humorous severity, or in their feigned gravity, have presumed to throw
imputations upon learning; which redargution nevertheless (save that we
know not whether our labours may extend to other ages) were not needful
for the present, in regard of the love and reverence towards learning
which the example and countenance of two so learned princes, Queen
Elizabeth and your Majesty, being as Castor and Pollux, lucida sidera,
stars of excellent light and most benign influence, hath wrought in all
men of place and authority in our nation.
Bacon, Francis.
The Advancement of Learning [Book II]. 1605.
Now therefore we come to that third sort of discredit or diminution
of credit that groweth unto learning from learned men themselves, which
commonly cleaveth fastest: it is either from their fortune, or from
their manners, or from the nature of their studies. For the first, it is
not in their power; and the second is accidental; the third only is
proper to be handled: but because we are not in hand with true measure,
but with popular estimation and conceit, it is not amiss to speak
somewhat of the two former. The derogations therefore which grow to
learning from the fortune or condition of learned men, are either in
respect of scarcity of means, or in respect of privateness of life and
meanness of employments.
Bacon, Francis.
The Advancement of Learning [Book III]. 1605.
And for meanness of employment, that which is most traduced to
contempt is that the government of youth is commonly allotted to them;
which age, because it is the age of least authority, it is transferred
to the disesteeming of those employments wherein youth is conversant,
and which are conversant about youth.
Bacon, Francis.
The Advancement of Learning [Book III]. 1605.
As touching the manners of learned men, it is a thing personal and
individual: and no doubt there be amongst them, as in other professions,
of all temperatures: but yet so as it is not without truth which is
said, that Abeunt studua in mores, studies have an influence and
operation upon the manners of those that are conversant in them.
Bacon, Francis.
The Advancement of Learning [Book III]. 1605.
Another fault likewise much of this kind hath been incident to
learned men, which is, that they have esteemed the preservation, good,
and honour of their countries or masters before their own fortunes or
safeties. For so saith Demosthenes unto the Athenians: “If it please you
to note it, my counsels unto you are not such whereby I should grow
great amongst you, and you become little amongst the Grecians; but they
be of that nature as they are sometimes not good for me to give, but are
always good for you to follow.”
Bacon, Francis.
The Advancement of Learning [Book III]. 1605.
Another fault incident commonly to learned men, which may be more
properly defended than truly denied, is that they fail sometimes in
applying themselves to particular persons, which want of exact
application ariseth from two causes — the one, because the largeness of
their mind can hardly confine itself to dwell in the exquisite
observation or examination of the nature and customs of one person, for
it is a speech for a lover, and not for a wise man, Satis magnum alter
alteri theatrum sumus. Nevertheless I shall yield that he that cannot
contract the sight of his mind as well as disperse and dilate it,
wanteth a great faculty. But there is a second cause, which is no
inability, but a rejection upon choice and judgment.
Bacon, Francis.
The Advancement of Learning [Book III]. 1605.
There is yet another fault (with which I will conclude this part)
which is often noted in learned men, that they do many times fail to
observe decency and discretion in their behaviour and carriage, and
commit errors in small and ordinary points of action, so as the vulgar
sort of capacities do make a judgment of them in greater matters by that
which they find wanting in them in smaller. But this consequence doth
oft deceive men, for which I do refer them over to that which was said
by Themistocles, arrogantly and uncivilly being applied to himself out
of his own mouth, but, being applied to the general state of this
question, pertinently and justly, when, being invited to touch a lute,
he said, “He could not fiddle, but he could make a small town a great
state.”
Bacon, Francis.
The Advancement of Learning [Book III]. 1605.
Not that I can tax or condemn the morigeration or application of
learned men to men in fortune. For the answer was good that Diogenes
made to one that asked him in mockery, “How it came to pass that
philosophers were the followers of rich men, and not rich men of
philosophers?” He answered soberly, and yet sharply, “Because the one
sort knew what they had need of, and the other did not.”
Bacon, Francis.
The Advancement of Learning [Book III]. 1605.
Now I proceed to those errors and vanities which have intervened
amongst the studies themselves of the learned, which is that which is
principal and proper to the present argument; wherein my purpose is not
to make a justification of the errors, but by a censure and separation
of the errors to make a justification of that which is good and sound,
and to deliver that from the aspersion of the other.
Bacon, Francis.
The Advancement of Learning [Book IV]. 1605.
