Fortune's fickle bounty, and while yet she smiled upon me, the hour of gloom had well-nigh overwhelmed my head. Now has the cloud put off its alluring face, wherefore without scruple my life drags out its wearying delays.
Boethius, Anicius Manlius Severinus. The Consolation of Philosophy. 520-562 A.D.
Why, O my friends, did ye so often puff me up, telling me that I was fortunate? For he that is fallen low did never firmly stand.
Boethius, Anicius Manlius Severinus. The Consolation of Philosophy. 520-562 A.D.
Ah me! how blunted grows the mind when sunk below the o'erwhelming flood! Its own true light no longer burns within, and it would break forth to outer dark nesses. How often care, when fanned by earthly winds, grows to a larger and unmeasured bane. This man has been free to the open heaven: his habit has it been to wander into the paths of the sky: his to watch the light of the bright sun, his to inqui re into the brightness of the chilly moon; he, like a conqueror, held fast bound in its order every star that makes its wandering circle, turning its peculiar course.
Boethius, Anicius Manlius Severinus. The Consolation of Philosophy. 520-562 A.D.
Then was dark night dispelled, the shadows fled away, and my ey es received returning power as before.'Twas just as when the heavenly bodies are enveloped by the west wind's rush, and the sky stands thick with watery clouds; the sun is hidden and the stars are not yet come into the sky, and night descending from above o'erspreads the earth: but if the north wind smites this scene, launched forth from the Thracian cave, it unlocks the imprisoned daylight; the sun shines forth, and thus sparkling Phoebus smites with his rays our wondering eyes.
Boethius, Anicius Manlius Severinus. The Consolation of Philosophy. 520-562 A.D.
'Are such your experiences, and do they sink into your soul?' she asked.'Do you listen only as "the dull ass to the lyre "? Why do you weep? Wherefore flow your tears? " Speak, nor keep secret in thine heart." If you expect a physician to help you, you must lay bare your wound.' Then did I rally my spirit till it was strong again, and answered,' Does the savage bitterness of my fortune still need recounting? Does it not stand forth plainly enough of itself? Does not the very aspect of this place strike you?
Boethius, Anicius Manlius Severinus. The Consolation of Philosophy. 520-562 A.D.
How often have I turned by force Trigulla,1 the overseer of the Emperor's household, from an unjust act that he had begun or even carried out! How many times have I put my own authority in danger by pro tecting those wretched people who were harried with unending false charges by the greed of barbarian Goths which ever went unpunished! Never, I say, has any man depraved me from justice to injustice. My heart has ached as bitterly as those of the su fferers when I have seen the fortunes of our subjects ruined both by the rapacity of persons and the taxes of the state.
Boethius, Anicius Manlius Severinus. The Consolation of Philosophy. 520-562 A.D.
Think you that I have raised up against myself bitter and great quarrels enough? But I ought to have been safer among those whom I helped; for, from my love of justice, I la id up for myself among the courtiers no resource to which I might turn for safety. Who, further, were the informers upon whose evidence I was banished? One was Basilius: he was formerly expelled from the royal service, and was driven by debt to info rm against me. Again, Opilio and Gaudentius had been condemned to exile by the king for many unjust acts and crimes: this decree they would not obey, and they sought sanctuary in sacred buildings, but when the king was aware of it, he declared that i f they departed not from Ravenna before a certain day, they should be driven forth branded upon their foreheads. What could be more stringent than this? Yet upon that very day information against me was laid by these same men and accepted. Why so?
Boethius, Anicius Manlius Severinus. The Consolation of Philosophy. 520-562 A.D.
'However, I leave it to your judgment and that of philosophers to decide how the justice of this may be; but I have committed to writing for history the true course of events, that posterity may not be ignorant thereof. I think it unnecessary to speak of the forged letters through which I am accused of " hoping for the freedom of Rome." The ir falsity would have been apparent if I had been free to question the evidence of the informers themselves, for their confessions have much force in all such business.
Boethius, Anicius Manlius Severinus. The Consolation of Philosophy. 520-562 A.D.
For the secret value of a conscience, that a pproves its own action, is lessened somewhat each time that it receives the reward of fame by displaying its deeds. But you see what end has fallen upon my innocency. In the place of the rewards of honest virtue, I am suffering the punishments of an ill deed that was not mine.
Boethius, Anicius Manlius Severinus. The Consolation of Philosophy. 520-562 A.D..
Yet, further, the innocent life within my home, my gathering of most honourable friends, my father-in-law Symmachus,l a man esteemed no less in his publ ic life than for his private conscientiousness, these all put far from me all suspicion of this crime. But -- O the shame of it! -- it is from you that they think they derive the warrant for such a charge, and we seem to them to be allied to ill-doin g from this very fact that we are steeped in the principles of your teaching, and trained in your manners of life.
Boethius, Anicius Manlius Severinus. The Consolation of Philosophy. 520-562 A.D.
I think I see t he intoxication of joy in the sin-steeped dens of criminals: I see the most abandoned of men intent upon new and evil schemes of spying: I see honest men lying crushed with the fear which smites them after the result of my perilous case: wicked men o ne and all encouraged to dare every crime without fear of punishment, nay, with hope of rewards for the accomplishment thereof: the innocent I see robbed not merely of their peace and safety, but even of all chance of defending themselves. So then I may cry aloud: --
Boethius, Anicius Manlius Severinus. The Consolation of Philosophy. 520-562 A.D.
Thus all things Thou dost rule with limits fixed: the lives of men alone dost Thou scorn to restrain, as a guardian, within bounds. F or why does Fortune with her fickle hand deal out such changing lots? The hurtful penalty is due to crime, but falls upon the sinless head: depraved men rest at ease on thrones aloft, and by their unjust lot can spurn beneath their hurtful heel the necks of vir tuous men. Beneath obscuring shadows lies bright virtue hid: the just man bears the unjust's infamy. They suffer not for forsworn oaths, they suffer not for crimes glozed over with their lies.
Boethius, Anicius Manlius Severinus. The Consolation of Philosophy. 520-562 A.D.
No other could have done so to you. For if you recall your true native country, you know that it is not under the rule of the many-headed people, as was Athens of old, but there is one Lord, one King, who rejoices in the greater number of his subjects, not in their banishment. To be guided b y his reins, to bow to his justice, is the highest liberty. Know you not that sacred and ancient law of your own state by which it is enacted that no man, who would establish a dwelling-place for himself therein, may lawfully be put forth? For there is no fear that any man should merit exile, if he be kept safe therein by its protecting walls. But any man that may no longer wish to dwell there, does equally no longer deserve to be there. Wherefore it is your looks rather than the aspect of this place which disturb me.
Boethius, Anicius Manlius Severinus. The Consolation of Philosophy. 520-562 A.D.
As for the crimes and wicked lies of the informers, you have rightly thought fit to touch but sho rtly thereon, for they are better and more fruitfully made common in the mouth of the crowd that discusses all matters. You have loudly and strongly upbraided the unjust ingratitude of the Senate: you have grieved over the charges made against mysel f, and shed tears over the insult to my fair fame: your last outburst of wrath was against Fortune, when you complained that she paid no fair rewards according to deserts: finally, you have prayed with passionate Muse that the same peace and order, t hat are seen in the heavens, might also rule the earth. But you are overwhelmed by this variety of mutinous passions: grief, rage, and gloom tear your mind asunder, and so in this present mood stronger measures cannot yet come nigh to heal you.
Boethius, Anicius Manlius Severinus The Consolation of Philosophy. 520-562 A.D.
For no man can ever make himself sure that she will neve r desert him, and thus has she deserted you. Do you reckon such happiness to be prized, which is sure to pass away? Is good fortune dear to you, which is with you for a time and is not sure to stay, and which is sure to bring you unhappiness when it is gone? But seeing that it cannot be stayed at will, and that when it flees away it leaves misery behind, what is such a fleeting thing but a sign of coming misery? Nor should it ever satisfy any man to look only at that which is placed before his eyes. Prudence takes measure of the results to come from all things.
Boethius, Anicius Manlius Severinus The Consolation of Philosophy. 520-562 A.D.
'How many are they, think you, who would think themselves raised to heaven if the smallest part of the remnants of your good fortune fell to them? This very place, which you call a place of exile, is home to those wh o live herein. Thus there is nothing wretched unless you think it to be so: and in like manner he who bears all with a calm mind finds his lot wholly blessed. Who is so happy but would wish to change his estate, if he yields to impatience of his lot? W ith how much bitterness is the sweetness of man's life mingled! For even though its enjoyment seem pleasant, yet it may not be surely kept from departing when it will. It is plain then how wretched is the happiness of mortal life which neither endures for ever with men of calm mind, nor ever wholly delights the care-ridden. Wherefore, then, O mortal men, seek ye that happiness without, which lies within yourselves? Ye are confounded by error and ignorance. I will shew you as shortly as I may, th e pole on which turns the highest happiness. Is there aught that you value more highly than your own self? You will answer that there is nothing.
Boethius, Anicius Manlius Severinus The Consolation of Philosophy. 520-562 A.D.
'Think again of precious stones: does their gleam attract your eyes? But any excellence they have is their own brilliance, and belongs not to men: wherefore I am amazed that men so strongly admire them. What manner of thing can that be which has no mind to influence, which has no structure of parts, and yet can justly seem to a living, reasoning mind to be beautiful? Though they be works of their creator, and by their own beauty and adornment have a certain low beauty, yet are they in rank lowe r than your own excellence, and have in no wise deserved your admiration.
Boethius, Anicius Manlius Severinus The Consolation of Philosophy. 520-562 A.D.
For if every good thing is allowed to be more valuable than that to which it belongs, surely you are putting yourselves lower than them in your estimation, since you think precious the most worthless of things; a nd this is indeed a just result. Since, then, this is the condition of human nature, that it surpasses other classes only when it realises what is in itself; as soon as it ceases to know itself, it must be reduced to a lower rank than the beasts. To ot her animals ignorance of themselves is natural; in men it is a fault. How plainly and how widely do you err by thinking that anything can be adorned by ornaments that belong to others! Surely that cannot be. For if anything becomes brilliant by additi ons thereto, the praise for the brilliance belongs to the additions. But the subject remains in its own vileness, though hidden and covered by these externals.
Boethius. The Consolation of Philosophy. 520-562 A.D..
The really important object of a desire, is that for the sake of which anything is sought, as a means. For instance, if a man wishes to ride for the sake of his health, he does not so much desire the motion of riding, as the effect, namely health.
Boethius, Anicius Manlius Severinus. The Consolation of Philosophy. 520-562 A.D.
Then such things as differ among themselves are not goods, but they become so when they begin to be a single unity. Is it not then the ca se these become goods by the attainment of unity? '
'Yes,' I said,' it seems so.'
'But I think you allow that every good is good by participation in good? '
'Yes, I do.'
'Then by reason of this likeness both unity and good must be allowed to be the same thing; for such things as have by nature the same operation, have the same essence.'
'Undeniably.'
Boethius, Anicius Manlius Severinus. The Consolation of Philosophy. 520-562 A.D.
Nature grants to each what suits it, and works against their perishing while they can possibly remain alive. I need hardly remind you that all plants seem to have their mouths buried in the earth, and so they suck up nourishment by their roots and diffuse their strength through their pith and bark: the pith being the softest part is always hidden away at the heart and covered, protected, as it were, by the strength of the wood; while outside, the bark, as being the defender who endures the best, is opposed to the unkindness of the we ather. Again, how great is nature's care, that they should all propagate themselves by the reproduction of their seed; they all, as is so well known, are like regular machines not merely for lasting a time, but for reproducing themselves for ever, a nd that by their own kinds. Things too which are supposed to be inanimate, surely do all seek after their own by a like process. For why is flame carried upward by its lightness, while solid things are carried down by their weight, unless it be that these positions and movements are suitable to each? Further, each thing preserves what is suitable to itself, and what is harmful, it destroys. Hard things, such as stones, cohere with the utmost tenacity of their parts, and resist easy dissolution; while liquids, water, and air, yield easily to division, but quickly slip back to mingle their parts.
Boethius, Anicius Manlius Severinus. The Consolation of Philosophy. 520-562 A.D.
For the body, though it brings material mass which breeds forgetfulness, has never driven forth all light from the mind. The seed of truth does surely cling within, and can be roused as a spark by the fanning of philosophy. For if it is not so, how do ye men make answers true of your own instinct when teachers question you? Is it not that the quick spark of truth lies buried in the heart's low depths? And if the Muse of Plato sends through those depths the voice of truth, each man has not forgotten a nd is but reminding himself of what he learns.
Boethius, Anicius Manlius Severinus. The Consolation of Philosophy. 520-562 A.D.
'And I think so now,' I said,'and will never think there is any doubt thereof; and I will shortly explain b y what reasoning I arrive at that point. This universe would never have been suitably put together into one form from such various and opposite parts, unless there were some One who joined such different parts together; and when joined, the very vari ety of their natures, so discordant among themselves, would break their harmony and tear them asunder unless the One held together what it wove into one whole. Such a fixed order of nature could not continue its course, could not develop motions tak ing such various directions in place, time, operation, space, and attributes, unless there were One who, being immutable, had the disposal of these various changes. And this cause of their remaining fixed and their moving, I call God, according to th e name familiar to all.'
Boethius, Anicius Manlius Severinus. The Consolation of Philosophy. 520-562 A.D.
'Are you playing with me,' I asked,' weaving arguments as a labyrinth out of which I shall find no way? You may enter a labyrinth by th e way by which you may come forth: come now forth by the way you have gone in: or are you folding your reason in some wondrous circle of divine simplicity? A little while ago you started from happiness, and said that happiness was the highest good; a nd you shewed how that rested in the highest Deity. And you reasoned that God too was the highest good, and the fullest happiness; and you allowed, as though granting a slight gift, that none could be happy except such as were similarly divine. Agai n, you said that the essence of God and of happiness was identical with the very form of good; and that that alone was good which was sought by all nature.
Boethius, Anicius Manlius Severinus. The Consolation of Philosophy. 520-562 A.D.
THUS gently sang the Lady Philosophy with dignified mien and grave countenance; and when she ceased, I, who had not thoroughly forgotten the grief with in me, interrupted her as she was about to speak further.' Herald of true light,' I said,'right clear have been the outpourings of your speech till now, seeming inspired as one contemplates them, and invincible through your reasonings. And though th rough grief for the injustices I suffer, I had forgotten them, yet you have not spoken of They what I knew not at all before. But this one thing is the chief cause of my grief, namely that, when there exists a good governor of the world, evils should exist at all, or, existing, should go unpunished. I would have you think how strange is this fact alone. But there is an even stranger attached thereto: ill-doing reigns and flourishes, while virtue not only lacks its reward, but is even trampled un derfoot by wicked doers, and pays the penalties instead of crime. Who can wonder and complain enough that such things should happen under the rule of One who, while all-knowing and all-powerful, wills good alone? '
Boethius, Anicius Manlius Severinus. The Consolation of Philosophy. 520-562 A.D.
You may say, for instance, that a corpse is a dead man, but you cannot call it a man. In a like manner, though I grant that wicked men are bad, I cannot allow that they are men at all, as regards absolute being. A thing exists which keeps its proper place and preserves its nature; but when anything falls away from its nature, its existence too ceases, for that lies in its nature. You will say, " Evil men are capable of evil ": and t hat I would not deny. But this very power of theirs comes not from strength, but from weakness. They are capable of evil; but this evil would have no efficacy if it could have stayed under the operation of good men. And this very power of ill shews t he more plainly that their power is naught. For if, as we have agreed, evil is nothing, then, since they are only capable of evil, they are capable of nothing '
Boethius, Anicius Manlius Severinus. The Consolation of Philosophy. 520-562 A.D.
But the power of committing crime has no possible relation to the good. Therefore it is not an object of desire. Yet, as we said, all power is to be desired.
Boethius, Anicius Manlius Severinus. The Consolation of Philosophy. 520-562 A.D.
'Then the wicked are far more unhappy when they are unjustly unpunished, than when they are justly punished. It is plain that it is just that the wicked should be punished, and unfair that they should escape punishment.'
Boethius, Anicius Manlius Severinus. The Consolation of Philosophy. 520-562 A.D.
Think upon the sacred ordinances of eternal law. If your mind is fashioned after better things, there is no need of a judge to award a prize; you have added yourself to the number of the more excellent. If your mind sinks to worse things, seek no avenger from without: you have thrust yourself downward to lower things. It is as though you were looking at the squalid earth and the heavens in turn; then take away all that is about you; and by the power of sight, you will seem to be in the midst now of mud, now of stars. But mankind looks not to such things. What then shall we do? Shall we join ourselves to those whom we have shewn to be as beasts?
Boethius, Anicius Manlius Severinus. The Consolation of Philosophy. 520-562 A.D.
'The engendering of all things, the whole advance of all changing natures, and every motion and progress in the world, draw their causes, their order, and their forms from the allotment of the unchanging mind of God, which lays manifold restrictions on all action from the calm fortress of its own directness Such restrictions are called Providence when they can be seen to lie in the very simplicity of divine understanding; but they were called Fate in old times when they were viewed with reference to the objects which they moved or arranged. It will easily be understood that these two are very different if the mind examines the force of each. For Providence is the very divine reason which arranges all things, and rests with the supreme disposer of all; while Fate is that ordering which is a part of all changeable things, and by means of which Providence binds all things together in their own order. Providence embraces all things equally, however different they may be, even however infinite: when they are assigned to their own places, forms, and times, Fate sets them in an orderly motion; so that this development of the temporal order, unified in the intelligence of the mind of God, is Providence.
Boethius, Anicius Manlius Severinus. The Consolation of Philosophy. 520-562 A.D.
Practically the whole Gothic nation migrated with Theodoric's army to Italy, where Odoacer was thrice defeated. He cons ented to allow Theodoric to reign jointly with him, but he was conveniently assassinated very soon afterwards, and Theodoric ruled till he died in 526, leaving the country certainly in a better state than that in which he found it, having ruled with m oderation on the whole, and choosing good ministers such as Boethius. But in his last years he became influenced by unscrupulous men, informers, barbarian Ostrogoths, who oppressed the Italians, and the most bitter Arian sectaries, by each of which c lasses Boethius was hated as an honest and powerful minister, a protector of the oppressed Italians and as an orthodox Christian.
Boethius, Anicius Manlius Severinus. The Consolation of Philosophy. 520-562 A.D.
I was eager to offer and communicate to you this long pondered question, shaped by arguments and set down in writing –as much as divine light has deemed my mind’s flicker worthy to the task– since I am as much desirous of your judgment as I am excited about our discovery.
Boethius, Anicius Manlius Severinus. On the Holy Trinity. 519 A.D.
To be sure, it is right for us to investigate as far as the gaze of human reason has the strength to ascend the high places of divinity. For there is a single boundary, so to speak, set for other arts, up to which the way of reason can proceed. For Medicine does not always bring health to the sick, but there will be no blame for the doctor who omits none of those things which ought to have been done, and the same holds for other arts. But seeing how the present inquiry is even more difficult, pardon ought to be given all the more freely.
Boethius, Anicius Manlius Severinus. On the Holy Trinity. 519 A.D.
Many usurp the dignity of the Christian religion, but this faith alone flourishes best which is called catholic and universal, both because of the maxims of its universal principals, by which the authority of the same religion is understood, and because its cul- tivation has spread through nearly all the ends of the earth.
Boethius, Anicius Manlius Severinus. On the Holy Trinity. 519 A.D.
But divine substance is form without matter, and it is therefore one, and it is what it is: but other things are not what they are. For every single thing has its particular being from those things from which it is, i.e. from its conjoined parts; it is one thing and an- other, i.e. the parts of its own composition, but it is not either one thing or the other sim- ply, e.g. when an earthly man consists of soul and body, he is a body and a soul, not a body or a soul in part; therefore he is not what he is.
Boethius, Anicius Manlius Severinus. On the Holy Trinity. 519 A.D.
But God differs from no God, neither are [Gods] separate in accidents or in sub- stantial differences which have been posited in a subject. But where there is no differ- ence, there is no plurality at all, therefore no [plural] number, and thus unity alone. For even though ‘God’ is thrice repeated when Father, Son and Holy Ghost are named, the three unities do not produce a plurality of number in respect to that which they truly are, if we turn to countable things and not to the number itself. For in the latter case, the repetition of unities produces a plural number.
Boethius, Anicius Manlius Severinus. On the Holy Trinity. 519 A.D.
For in-stance, if I were to say concerning the same thing, ‘one sword, one blade, one brand,’ - since one sword can be known by so many terms- this is an iteration of unities, not an enumeration. For instance, if we were to say, ‘brand, blade, sword,’ this is, so to speak, a repetition of the same thing, not an enumeration of different things. Or if I were to say, ‘sun, sun, sun,’ I would not have produced three suns, but I would have predicated of one sun so many times.
Boethius, Anicius Manlius Severinus. On the Holy Trinity. 519 A.D.
But it does not follow that “Father, Son and Holy Ghost” is said as though of some synonymous thing; for blade and bland are identical and the same, but Father, Son and Holy Ghost are indeed the same, but not identical. This matter will be looked into shortly. For to those asking, “is the Father identical to the Son?” they (i.e. Catholics) say, “not at all.” Again, to the question, “is the one the same as the other?” the answer is no.
Boethius, Anicius Manlius Severinus. On the Holy Trinity. 519 A.D.
But when one applies these to divine predication, everything that can be predi- cated is changed. Relation is not at all able to be predicated, for the substance in question is not a true substance, but beyond substance; the same holds for quality and all the rest which can arise. That our understanding may be greater, examples are given as follows. For when we say ‘God’ we indeed seem to signify a substance, but the sort that is beyond substance; yet when we say ‘just’ we indeed signify a quality: not an accident, […]
Boethius, Anicius Manlius Severinus. On the Holy Trinity. 519 A.D.
“God is just,” we declare a particular man or God to be just; but there is a difference, since a man and a just man are two things, but God is the same as that which is just. And again ‘great’ is said of man or God, as if a particular man were himself great or if God were great; but man is merely great, whereas God exists as greatness itself.
Boethius, Anicius Manlius Severinus. On the Holy Trinity. 519 A.D.
Time is predicated in the same way, as concerning man, “yesterday he came,” or concerning God, “He always is.” And he, whose yesterday arrival was mentioned, is said to be such, not as though this amounted to something, but merely that which has befallen him in respect to time is predicated. But the fact that it is said of God, “He always is,” indeed signifies one thing, as if for all the past, “He was,” in every present, -whatever that means- “He is,” and for every future time, “He will be.” But that which according to Phi- losophers can be said of Heaven and other immortal bodies cannot be said of God in the same way.
Boethius, Anicius Manlius Severinus. On the Holy Trinity. 519 A.D.
Come now, let us look into relatives, for the sake of which we took up discussion of everything that has been said; for those things that are clearly observed as existing from another's arrival least of all seem to produce predication according to them- selves. Come then, as ‘master’ and ‘slave’ are relatives, let us see whether or not either stands as a predicate according to itself. If you should remove the slave, you will have removed the master as well; but it is not the same situation if you should remove white- ness that you will also remove the white thing, and the difference is that whiteness is ac- cidental to the white thing, such that with whiteness removed, the white thing doubtless ceases as well, but in the case of the master, if you should remove the slave, the name by which the master is so called ceases, yet the slave is not accidental to the mas- ter, as whiteness is to a white thing,4 but there is a certain force by which the slave is co- erced. Because this force is lost when the slave has been removed, it is clear that it is not in and of itself accidental to the master, but [it is accidental to the master] through an ac- cident which is in some way external to the slaves.
Boethius, Anicius Manlius Severinus. On the Holy Trinity. 519 A.D.
Thus if ‘Father’ and ‘Son’ are predicated in relation, and they differ in no respect but this relation alone, as was stated, and if this relation is predi- cated neither relative to that of which it is predicated, as though it were the same, nor ac- cording to the thing itself of which it is said, then this predicate does not produce a differ- ence of things in that of which it is spoken, but indeed -if it can be said- it produces something that can scarcely be understood: a difference of persons. For there is wholly great truth to the rule that among incorporeal things distances are produced by differ- ences, not by locations.
Boethius, Anicius Manlius Severinus. On the Holy Trinity. 519 A.D.
The comprehension, and to proceed by intellect, as far as it befits the intellect to go. But enough has been said on the question posed. The precision of the question now awaits the T-square of your judgment; the authority of your pronouncement deter- mines whether it has been gone over correctly or not.
Boethius, Anicius Manlius Severinus. On the Holy Trinity. 519 A.D.
But if in accordance with the most solid proposition of the fundament of our faith and with divine grace helping we display these fitting aids of arguments, may then the joy of this perfect work return to the place from which its completion came. But if it has been denied humanity to rise beyond itself, as much as ineptitude draws us down, my prayers will make good.
Boethius, Anicius Manlius Severinus. On the Holy Trinity. 519 A.D.